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1 Table of Abbreviations 
  
  
ANP    National Petroleum Agency 
 
BP MIGAS:    Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak Dan Gas Bumi               
(Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activity)  
 
CNPE   National Council of Energy Policy 
 
HC      Host Country  
 
IOC     International Oil Company 
 
MEP   Minimum Exploratory Program  
 
MINFIN:             Ministry of Finance (Angola) 
 
MINPET:            Ministry of Industry and Petroleum (Angola) 
 
NNPC:                Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Nigéria) 
 
NOC:                   National Oil Company 
 
NPC:                   National Petroleum Consultants 
 
NPD:                   Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
 
OC      Oil Company 
 
PEM:                   Plano Exploratório Mínimo 
 
Pertamina:           National Oil and Natural Gas Company 
 
PDVSA:              Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
 
PETROBRAS:    Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. 
 
PROMINP:         O&G Brazilian Industry Mobilization Program (Programa de  da 
Indústria Nacional de Petróleo e Gás Natural) 
 
PSC:                    Production Sharing Contracts (Contratos de Partilha de Produção) 
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ROR:   Rate of Return 
 
Sonangol:            Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola 
 3
2 Introduction 
 
When the sub-salt reservoirs1 were discovered just off the coast of Brazil the Brazilian 
Government started to evaluate the need for adopting the legal system governing the 
exploration and production of petroleum in Brazil. The main objectives were to increase 
Governmental control and participation in future block and to increase the Governmet 
take. It was a widespread understanding that the current Concession system was not 
appropriate in order to take full advantage of the natural resources in the reserves.  With 
the discovery of this new field, the conditions for exploring and producing oil and gas 
in Brazil changed, because of the high quantity and quality of the field. Thus, the 
Brazilian Government decided to introduce the Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) in 
this new field.  
 
 
Picture:The sub-salt reservoirs marked in blue. Courtesy Petrobras 
                                                 
1 The sub-salt reservoirs are deep-sea reservoir discovered off the east coast of Brazil. 
The sub-salt is the biggest reservoir ever discovered in Brazil.  
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This thesis endeavours to convey the main positive and negative aspects of introducing 
this new regime. We will also try to draw some conclusions regarding the effects that 
this alteration will have for the International Oil Companies (IOCs), the Government 
take and the Governmental control over the industry. In addition we try to discover 
what were the motivations for introducing this new regime and if these objectives have 
been obtained.  
 
Independently of the fiscal system utilized, the main point of the financial question is 
how the costs are recuperated and how the profit is divided. The main objective in this 
situtation is to maximize the Governmental participation and at the same time maintain 
the interests of the IOCs. To achieve this the Host Country (HC) has to formulate and 
implement a tax system which permits a fair return to the State and to the industry, 
avoids innapropriate speculation, prevent unnecessary administrative costs, is flexible, 
keeps a steady production and does not contribute to fluctuations in the price of 
hydrocarbons. Finally the tax regime must create a healthy environment for 
competition. The taxation system should also take into consideration the geological and 
political risks, as well as the potentials gains of the production.  
 
In order for oil companies to make rational investment decisions, the framework 
conditions must be predictable and transparent. This is the general basis for the 
incentive system. However, the change from Concession to Production Sharing may 
affect the transparency of the system. This may again affect the willingness of foreign 
companies to invest in the Brazilian oil industry. Even so, the Brazilian Government 
has initiated this process in order to increase the capital flow from the investing 
companies to the Government so that the petroleum can benefit the Brazilian population 
to a larger extent.  
 
To explore for oil or gas, it is necessary to have access to blocks, which are not usually 
owned by the company conducting the exploration. Even if they are, an oil company 
must ensure that it has all necessary and relevant permits and authorities to enable it to 
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do so.2 To get the relevant permission the International Oil Company (IOC) may have 
to work in cooperation with the Host Country (HC) to reach an agreement. To reach this 
agreement there will be a price. Procedurally in most jurisdictions these consents come 
in one of two forms: either the grant Concession in the form of a license or a lease, or 
by the conclusion of a Production Sharing Contract.3  
 
This dissertation aims to discuss the petroleum arrangements and to analyze the facts 
that led to the creation of Concessions and Production Sharing Contracts (PSC). 
Subsequently, it will look at the main features of Concessions by analyzing the 
Brazilian regulatory framework for oil activities. Next, the main features of a 
Production Sharing Contract will be brought into discussion. At the end, this 
dissertation will compare both regimes from a contractual perspective in order to 
answer whether it is really necessary to adopt a new regulatory framework based on a 
Production Sharing Contract for the Sub-salt area in Brazil. 
 
This thesis will give an overview of the contracts used in Brazil for exploration and 
development. Chapter 2 will give an overview of the Concession regime, by first 
explaining the main features and the main revenues. Chapter 3 presents the new 
regulatory framework, Production Sharing Contracts, and brings the main terms of the 
contracts and the main revenues into the discussion. In this chapter we will also address 
the opening of the new company Petro-Sal. Chapter 4 presents the comparative analysis 
of both regulatory systems and presents the main differences between the Concession 
Regime and PSC. The Concession Regime currently is utilized in Brazil and we look at 
the experience of using this system in Brazil and compare these experiences to the 
experiences of the PSC in other countries, such as Angola and Indonesia.  
 
In Chapter 5, the fiscal perspective with regard to royalties and revenues will be 
considered. Again, we compare the Concession and the PSC regimes and look at how 
the two regimes affect the Government take. Chapter 6 compares various countries that 
utilize the PSC regime. We also compare these to the Norwegian Concession Regime.  
 
                                                 
2 A. Jennings, Oil and Gas Exploration Contracts, 2002 
3 Ibid. 
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Even though we will learn that both the Concession and the PSC regimes can obtain 
more or less the same when it comes to financial output, it is still possible to identify 
some advantages and disadvantages of each system. This is addressed in detail in 
Chapter 7.  
 
In conclusion, it will be demonstrated that the PSC brings no real benefits to Brazil. 
From a fiscal perspective, both regimes can achieve the same financial results and 
simply changing the contractual regime will not necessarily increase the Government 
take. Therefore, if the Brazilian Government’s aim is to increase the level of 
Government take for the Sub-salt area, it can be easily done through the existing fiscal 
regime. From a contractual perspective, there is no relevant difference between the 
regimes when it comes to Government control and provisions related to each phase of 
the project.  
 
2.1 The Background of the Brazilian Oil and Gas System 
During the period of 1997-2009 we have seen an incredible progress in the Brazilian 
Exploration and Production (E&P) industry. Furthermore, the opening of the market to 
International Oil companies (IOCs) and the establishment of the Concession regime 
made a huge difference in the Brazilian oil and gas upstream industry. The number of 
IOCs operating in Brazil increased considerably during this period. One of the central 
points in the debate on the Sub-salt is regarding the regulatory framework governing 
exploration and production of petroleum. There are three models that have been utilized 
in the Brazilian history of petroleum: 
a) The service contract, which has been utilized in Brazil since 1975. The 
results obtained during this period were not positive due to instable currency 
associated with the low prices of the petroleum.  
b) The Concession regime, adopted in 1997, will be maintained in 28% of the 
Sub-salt reservoirs.  
c) The Production Sharing Contracts proposed by the Lula Government in 
2009 will be utilized in the remaining areas of the Sub-salt. 
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A decade after the adoption of the Concession regime, the Sub-salt area was discovered. 
The Sub-salt area became known to the public in November 2007 when Petrobrasthe 
Brazilian National Oil Companymade one of the most important announcements in 
its history: the discovery of a large oil reservoir in the Tupi field. Tupi was the first 
discovery in the Sub-salt area that, according to estimates, could take Brazil to a 
selected group of countries with substantial oil and natural gas reserves.4 
 
Considering the huge investments associated with oil exploration, the Brazilian system 
needs the inceptive and investments of the international oil companies to motivate its 
own industry. Since the adoption of the Concession regime in 1997, the Concession 
regime has proven successful. The growth of the oil and gas industry in Brazil and its 
benefits to the national economy are a result of straightforward rules and a transparent 
Concession regime by which the Brazilian Government, through the National Agency 
of Petroleum (ANP), grants the rights to explore and exploit oil and gas in exchange for 
the payment of all costs, Government participation, and specific taxes related to the 
operation. Guarantees that contracts will be fulfilled by the Government and the fiscal 
and regulatory stability it imposes give the licensee the necessary legal stability to 
invest in petroleum and gas.  
 
The legal background of Concession is found in articles 176 of the Brazilian Federal 
Constitution CF/88 c/c, articles 3º, 21 and 26 of the Law of Oil, where it is stated that 
the IOC becomes the owner of the property, having the rights to the resources after the 
extraction. Besides, the Law of Oil brought diverse other arrangements detailing the 
regulation of the activity5. First of all it created the National Council of Energy Policy 
(CNPE)6 which is the regulating organ of the industry, linked to the Department of 
Mines and Energy.  
 
Futhermore, Law 9.478/97 brought some alterations to the Brazilian system, introduced 
in:  
                                                 
4 Brazil's to use a Production Sharing system for pre-salt oil exploration." Downloaded 26/05/2010, from 
http://www.petroleumworld.com 
5 See article 176, of the Brazilian Federal Constitutional 1988 c/c with article 3 of the law of Oil 9.478/97  
6 The National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE)  is a Government entity responsible for energy policy.   
 8
a) the creation of the regulating agency (CNPE) for the sector;  
b) of other Government revenues, in addition to the royalties (the Signature 
bonus, special participation and rent of Occupation of the area and retention 
of the areas); 
c) an increase in the royalties from 5 to 10% of the production;  
d) Government mechanisms for deciding the price of oil and gas produced in 
Brazil;  
e) new ways to collect the taxes and other payments from the IOCs;  
f) opening of the market for other companies; and 
g) incentive to the development of the local industry. 7 
Considering the above, the Law of Oil also made a few changes in regards to Petrobras 
in order for Petrobras to adapt to the new reality, which now involved a more 
competitive character.  
 
2.2 The New Regulatory Framework 
Despite of the success of the Concession regime, in July of 2009 the Government 
proposed the adoption of a new regulatory framework called Production Sharing 
Contract, or Contract (“Reforma de Partilha”). This included the creation of a state-
owned company whose main objective was to take a larger share of the revenues from 
the pre-salt areas differently to the Concession system which is based on the royalty/tax 
model. In fact, the idea was to create a parallel system of Production Sharing contracts 
for big reservoirs emerging from the Sub-salt zone, while retaining Concessions for 
reservoirs outside the Sub-salt. 
  
The reasons why Brazil is rising so fast as an oil power are in large part the same 
reasons it has surged to the front lines of the emerging markets: economic stability and 
a resilient democracy with respect for the rules of the free market.8 Because of the 
stability and the considerable growth both in Brazilian economy and the petroleum 
industry, the Brazilian Government decided that alteration of the regime is more 
favorable, since there was no reason to maintain the Concession regime, as President 
                                                 
7 See Law of Oil, 9.478/97 
8 Marc Margolis, http://www.newsweek.com/id/216615, Download  26/07/2010 
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Lula said: “The only reason to keep a Concession system is if a country is not certain it 
will find petroleum.”9  
 
The legal regulatory regime of exploitation and production of hydrocarbons describes 
the way the Government regulates the oil producing activities and other related 
activities, and how the Government is related with the different agents of the industry. 
The legal regulatory regime thus determines the relation and the involvement between 
the Host Country (HC) and the International Oil Companies (IOCs).  
 
There are two basic arrangements for exploration and exploitation of petroleum around 
the world: Concessions and contracts. Contracts can be divided into three types: 
Production Sharing, risk service, and pure contracts. The basic difference between 
Concessions and contracts lies in the division of the oil and gas between the state and 
the IOC10. The contract that we will examine in this thesis is the Production Sharing 
contract that was recently adopted in the Brazilian Sub-salt.  
 
As an overview of the different arrangements we will mention some of the main 
characteristics of the 2 most utilized regimes. The main aspects concerning the most 
important contract for exploration of petroleum can be summarized as follows: 
 
 The Concession basically gives all production to the concessionaire while 
imposing commensurately higher tax and royalty rates. 
 
 The Production Sharing contract divides production between the Government 
and the Contractor after following a portion for cost recovery. It imposes lower 
income tax and sometimes royalty. 
 
The fiscal details are the only differences between the various types of petroleum 
arrangements. All other details of the contract or Concession (i.e., length of the 
exploration or exploitation phase, the relinquishment provisions, the employment and 
                                                 
9 Comments made by President Lula: http://www.petroleumworld.com downloaded 01.06.2010.  
10 Barrows, G. H. Worldwide Concession contracts and petroleum legislation, PennWell Books,1983.  
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training obligations, the supply of domestic consumption pro rata by the oil company, 
etc.) are essentially the same.11 They apply equally to all contracts and Concessions. 
 
Overlying these arrangements and accompanying any of them is joint venture. The joint 
venture is not a type of petroleum arrangement but is only a partnership between a 
company having a Concession or contract and another company (frequently a 
Governmental company) by which they agree to operate the venture jointly. They do 
this under their agreed partnership rules, called the operating agreement.12 The final 
category of petroleum arrangements is complete nationalization. 
 
2.3 Objective of the thesis 
In this thesis we will discuss several aspects concerning the recent changes in the 
regulatory framework in the Brazilian Sub-salt reservoirs. Even though the Production 
Sharing has shown to be a very successful formula for developing countries, there exist 
other systems with many of the same desirable characteristics. For example, we will see 
that in practice the State can exercise as much control through a modern Concession 
regime as through Production Sharing. In both regimes the oil company bears the 
financial risk, and is generally responsible for running and performing operations under 
the supervision of the State. Some Concessions may even be considered more 
restrictive than Production Sharing contracts, both when it comes to operating the 
facility and the economic aspects.13 
 
Concession was a successful regime with good results for both the HC and the IOCs. 
However, in adopting Production Sharing, the Government believes that they will have 
even more control of the oil industry. To fulfill this purpose, in this thesis, we have 
chosen to examine the legal and contractual aspects of both regimes by giving the main 
advantages and disadvantage in each system.  
 
During the work with this thesis I had access to the archives and contracts of DLA Piper 
                                                 
11  Barrows, G. H. Worldwide Concession contracts and petroleum legislation, PennWell Books,1983. 
12  Barrows, G. H. Worldwide Concession contracts and petroleum legislation, PennWell Books,1983. 
13 IFP, Publication, Oil and gas Exploration and Production 
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in Rio de Janeiro. I spent some time at the Rio office and actively used the contracts 
available. I also had acces to a work that DLA had written for BNDES (The Brazilian 
development bank), this work is classified and cannot be reproduced or referred to. 
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3 Concession Regime  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Concession regime is the regime currently used in Brazil. The Concession will be 
continued to be used in blocks outside the Sub-salt and in some blocks, for which the 
Concession is already granted, in the Sub-salt. The term Concession has in this context 
the same meaning as licence and refers to an agreement between the HC and an IOC 
granting exclusive rights to the oil company to explore for oil and gas within a specific 
region and for a specified duration of time.  
 
In Brazil the Concession regime was introduced through Law 9487/97, replacing the 
monopoly of Petrobras. Since the introduction of the Concession regime 10 licences 
have been granted. The Brazilian Concession is well recognized for it its openness and 
transparency.  
 
3.2 The Background of Concession Regime 
The Concession regime was the first system adopted to regulate the petroleum industry 
and is still the most widely used system throughout the world14. Basically, the 
Concession is an arrangement whereby the oil company is granted the right to explore 
and exploit oil and gas in exchange for the payment of all costs and also specific taxes 
related to the operation15. 
 
Under a Concession arrangement the Federal Government grants the contract holders 
exclusive exploration rights (exploration licence), as well as exclusive development and 
                                                 
14 Van Meuers, Pedro. Financial and fiscal arrangements for petroleum development on economic 
analysis,  1988  
15 Blinn, K. W. International petroleum exploration and exploitation agreements: legal, economic and 
policy aspects. London, Euromoney Publications,1986 
 13
production rights (lease or Concession) for each commercial discovery.16 The modern 
Brazilian Concession contract is based on the royalty/tax model. Companies interested 
in becoming a concessionaire must take part in a bidding round promoted by ANP 
(National Agency of Petroleum). The bidding critieria are transparent and constitute a 
system where each bidder are given points subject to the proposed signature bonus, the 
minimum work programme and local content percentage.  
 
If a company wins the bid and is granted a Concession contract, it assumes all costs and 
risks involved in the upstream activity. The concessionaires are entitled to 100% of the 
production at the wellhead and are given the right to export the crude oil or gas 
produced, subject to some obligations such as meeting national consumption and 
acquisition of local content.  
 
As far as the oil and gas industry is concerned, a Concession is a system by which the 
HC grants the concessionaire the exclusive rights to explore for and produce 
hydrocarbons in a given area of land for a certain period of time, in exchange for 
payment of royalty and taxes.17 A Concession comprises a contract in law, which 
protects the holder against unforeseen changes in case the petroleum legislation is 
altered.  
 
In general lines the contracting through a Concession regime in the oil and gas industry 
gives the contracted company the status as the owner and gives him the right to keep the 
hydrocarbons. The owner has exclusive right to explore and produce hydrocarbons, by 
his own expense and risk, becoming owner of the oil and gas produced according to the 
contracts and tax applied. This is the starting point to evaluate and identify what are the 
fundamental differences of this regime in relation with others. It is thus different than 
many other systems in that in the Concession regime the State is not the owner of the 
petroleum after it has been extracted.  
 
From a certain moment the HC started to interfere more directly in the form of contract, 
                                                 
16 IFP, oil and gas exploration and production. 
17 LLP, K. S.  "An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their Evolution  
and Current Use." OGEL 3(1), 2005. 
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which can be seen in the clauses that were adopted in the modernized Concession 
regime:  
a) smaller areas of Concession; 
b) well defined time limits;  
c) the ability for the State to intervene, through inspection, including the application 
of penalties and the right to cancel the Concession; 
d) a plan of development in the areas not utilized; 
e) local content, obligation to hire national companies for services and equipment; 
f)  obligation to generate jobs for the national companies and invest in higher 
education. 
 
3.3 Main Contractual Terms and Conditions of the Brazilian 
Concession  
Below is a summary of the features of the Brazilian Concession regime. The main terms 
such as exploration lenght, Concession area, and relinquishment can be modified in 
each different bidding round. Below we address the terms that are general for the 
Concession regime.  
 
3.3.1 Ownership of Production 
One of the main features of the Concession is that the hydrocarbons generally belong to 
the Federal Government until they are extracted from the subsoil.18 When hydrocarbons 
are extracted from the subsoil, they become the possession of the IOC. In other words, 
when the petroleum is explored, it belongs to the state, but when it is under production 
it belongs to the IOC. This State ownership of subsoil oil and mineral resources is quite 
                                                 
18 See article 20, item IX of Brazilian Federal Constitution and article 3 of the Law of Oil 9.478/97 . 
Federal Constituion-Article 20. The following are property of the Union: 
IX - the mineral resources, including those of the subsoil; 
Law  N. 9.478/97- Art. 3 combined with the alterations imposed by Law N. 5.938/09. The exploration 
and production of oil, natural gas and other fluid hydrocarbons in the pre-salt area and strategic areas will 
be contracted by the Federal Union under the regime of Production Sharing, as set forth in this Law. 
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commom, and is applied in many countries including Brazil. The hydrocarbons 
produced, however, belong to the concessionaire. According to the Brazilian 
Concession contract, the concessionaire has the sole and exclusive owneship of the oil 
and gas. The contract holder becomes the owner of all the hydrocarbons produced, 
subject to payment of a royalty in the form of oil and natural gas or in cash.  
In relation to the ownership of the hydrocarbons exploited, the fundamental difference 
between of the Concession Regime on one hand, and PSC and Service Contracts on the 
other, is that when applying the contract of Concession, licence or lease, the property of 
the hydrocarbons produced are transfered to the IOC that produced it. 
 
3.3.2 Ownership of Installation 
Another feature is the ownership of production installations, which under the 
Concession regime is owned by the holder of the Concession until his lease expires. 
The installation may then revert to the State without compensation for the holder. 
Alternatively the State can require the holder to remove at the latter’s expense.  
 
One of the main reasons for States to choose the Concession Regime is that it is a 
model in which the risks and costs of the activities of exploration, development, and 
production are paid in full by the IOC, that the IOC posesses total responsibility of 
acquiring and the installation of the equipment necessary to conduct the activities, and 
in this way, the IOC maintain the proprietary responsibilities of the equipment.  
 
The contract is finalized when all phases of the contract are fulfilled and the area is 
abandoned. Reversion of property only applies to the properties that are considered 
reversible, which in case of Brazilian legislation is any property of the IOC, both 
immovable and permanent property as well as movable equipment, existing in any 
installment in the area of Concession, according to the Law of Oil. The ANP decides 
the permits of continuity of the operations, or if these goods are of interest to the state.  
 
Another example of a HC which applies the reversion of property in this way is 
Norway, which protects the right to revert the property of the instalation utilized in the 
oil activities after the licence has expired. Another requirement of Norwegian law is the 
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condition that the installion is in good condition in order to guarantee safe operation 
also after the property has been returned. In case the installation is not in good shape, 
the IOC may be liable to pay a compesation. 
 
3.3.3 Parties and their Responsabilities in Each Phase 
Under the Concession regime, the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) is the main 
regulatory body for oil and gas activities in Brazil. ANP is in charge of granting the 
Concession rights and is thus the party representing the Brazilian Federal Government. 
The other party is the concessionaire who may be the operating company, possibly as a 
consortium of companies.  
 
There are some requirements that need to be met in order to be granted the contract 
under the Concession regime. During the phase of exploitation, the IOC has to submit a 
plan that states its purpose (Plano Exploratorio Minimo, PEM)19 to be approved by the 
ANP. Furthermore, if it is approved, the IOC has to perform the work in accordance 
with this PEM. The State is responsible for inspecting the operations of the IOC. 
Additionally the ANP determines the areas that are to be returned at the end of the 
exploitation.  
 
During the production phase the IOC, in case of hydrocarbons discovery, has the 
obligation to deliver a statement of marketability to the ANP. Once this statement is 
approved, the IOC is obliged to fulfill with the statement whitin 180 days after the 
statement was delivered to the ANP. During the auction process all auctionaires are 
required to submit a Plan of Development to the ANP. The ANP is then required to 
make sure that the IOC follows up with the Plan of Development submitted during the 
acution process.  
 
The IOC has the obligation to comunicate each step in the process to the ANP. Also, the 
IOC has to make a plan, and act according to the Minimun Regulatory Program (PEM). 
The concessionaire is liable to the ANP, the Government, and third parties for losses 
                                                 
19 Minimum Exploratory Program, is the work program (such as seismic 2D and 3D), some potential 
methods and exploration(PEM) 
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and damages deriving from their activities. It should also obtain appropriate insurance 
for the operations.  
 
3.3.4 Costs and Risks 
According to the Brazilian Concession agreement, the IOCs must always assume all 
costs and risks related to the operations and its consequences, as well as bear all losses 
it may incur, without being entitled to any payment, reimbursement or 
indemnification.20 
 
3.3.5 Grants of Rights 
The Brazilian Concession agreement grants the rights to the IOCs to explore for and 
produce hydrocarbons within the Concession area. Basically, the concessionaire has 
exclusive rights to drill and production rights with free access to the Concession area 
and also the ownership of the hydrocarbons from the wellhead. As a result, the IOC also 
owns the rights of commercialization. Another prerogative is the right to export, subject 
to the ANP’s authorization.  
 
3.4 The Main Revenues 
In Brazil, as already mentioned, the activities of exploitation, development, and 
production of oil and of natural gas are exercised throught the contracts of Concession. 
The Concession is granted to the highest bidder in the auction.  
 
The contract of Concession thus determines what contributions the IOC has to pay, such 
as:  
a) Signature bonus;  
b) royalties;  
c) special participation; and  
                                                 
20 See Clause 2.2 of the Brazilian Concession Agreement (Annex I). 
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d) payment of the occupation and retention of the area. 21 
 
The criterias for the collection of wealth generated throught the exploration have 
undergode several alterations, that can be seen in the modernized Concession regime: 
a) the royalties of the hydrocarbons are determined based on the market price of 
the oil or gas;  
b) increased taxation; 
c) more rigid control over book-keeping.  
 
The most important revenues and their main aspects are discussed in the following.  
 
3.4.1 Signature Bonus  
The signature bonus is the amount offered by the winning bidder in the proposal for the 
Concession of crude oil and natural gas, and is to be paid to the ANP on the date of 
execution of the Concession agreement. 22 
 
The signature bonus is the value paid by the company that wins the auction of the 
determined area of Concession. In Brazil, the minimum value of the signature bonus is 
established in announcement and corresponds to the payment offered in the proposal for 
obtaining of the Concession. The bonus is to be paid when signing of the contract, in 
one single payment.  
 
3.4.2 Royalties  
The royalty is a financial compensation to be paid monthly by the concessionaires 
operating each field, starting in the month of the respective start-up production date, 
without the allowance of any deductions. Royalties generally correspond to a 
percentage ranging between 5% and 10% of the reference prices for oil or natural gas, 
as established in the relevant bidding guidelines and Concession contract. In Brazil all 
                                                 
21 See article 45, section IV, Law of Oil 9.478/97- this article involves remuneration for the state in 
exchange for the right to a Concession to engage in oil and natural gas exploration activities. 
22 See article 46, section IV , Law of Oil 9.478/97. 
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fields in production currently pay the maximum 10% rate.23 In determining the royalties 
applicable to a particular Concession block, the ANP takes into consideration, among 
other factors, the geological risks involved and the production levels expected.24 
 
The royalties are one of the oldest forms of payment for rights. They are applied to both 
onshore and offshore production and establish a financial contribution to the State from 
the companies that explore and produce oil and natural gas. This contribution can be 
regarded a compensation for the fact that non-renewable and scarce products are 
extracted from the HC’s territory.  
 
3.4.3 Special Participation Fee  
The Special Participation Fee constitutes an extraordinary financial compensation by 
the concessionaires of exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas to the 
Government, in the special case when there is a large volume of production or high 
earnings. The rate is determined for each field of a determined Concession area.  
 
For the assessment of the Special Participation over the crude oil and natural gas 
production, progressive rates ranging from 0% to 40% are applied on the production net 
revenue for each field on a quarterly-basis depending on: (i) volume of production and 
(ii) whether the block is onshore or offshore and, (iii) if offshore, whether it is located 
in shallow or deep water.25 ANP also establishes the expences that can be deducted in 
order to calculate the Special Participation. The main purpose of the Special 
Participation Fee is to capture the extraordinary profits. 
 
3.4.4 Payment for the Occupation and Retention of the Area 
Art. 50 of the Law Nº 9.478/97 determines the payment for the occupation and retention 
of all areas in Brazil. This payment is normally it called a rental fee, and is a normal 
                                                 
23 See article 45, Section II, Law of Oil 9.478/97 –the royalties constitute financial compensation due by 
the Concession holders for petroleum and natural gas exploration and production. 
24 inter.bndes.gov.br/english/studies/petro.pdf (Download 14/06/2010) 
25 See Article 50, Section VI, Law of Oil 9.478/97.Item III ,involves extraordinary financial 
compensation paid by the Concession holder due to a huge production volume or high profitability of a 
field or block. 
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form of payment in several oil producing countries. 26 
 
The payment of the occupation and retention of the site is to be made annually. This 
payment is determined by size of the block and is determined every calendar year, from 
the signing of the contract of Concession, and is to be paid the 15 of January of the 
subsequent year. For the calculation of value, the number by days for which the contract 
is valid in each year must be taken into accout.  
 
When the site is on land the Concession contract should also include a clause that 
determines the payment to the holders of the land. This payment should reflect the 
fraction of land for each land holder and should be paid in local currency. The payment 
is decided by the ANP, but restricted to be between 0.5% and 1% of the output of oil or 
natural gas. 27 
 
3.5 The Licitation Process and Manifestation of Interest  
The Concession process should be initiated with a manifestation of interest of the IOC. 
The IOCs that desire to participate in the rounds of licitation promoted by the ANP 
have to acquire all necessary information. In addition, for the IOC to acquire the right to 
explore some requirements such as technical, legal and financial qualification need to 
be respected.  
 
3.6 Remuneration of the IOC 
In the applicable legal regime in Brazil, the result of the Concession is an obligation 
imposed on the IOC to explore the determined area at its count and risk and, in case of 
success (i.e., if oil is found), to produce oil or natural gas. The IOC will also be the 
rightfull owner of the hydrocarbons after extracted.  
 
In this way, having in mind that the hydrocarbons belong to the IOC after they have 
                                                 
26 See Article 50, Section VI, Law of Oil 9.478/97 c/c article 51 and Decree 2705/98, is to be calculated 
for each year of the calendar,this payment is computed considering the units value. The Decree 2705/98, 
also establishes the maximum and minimum 
27 See Article 52, Section VI, Law of Oil 9.478/97 
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been extracted, the income of the IOC will be a result of commercialization of the 
petroleum. The IOC does not receive any additional compensation for extracting the 
petroleum. In addition the IOC also bears the whole risk of oscillating market prices, 
something that directly affects the return on the investment.  
 
3.7 Local Content 
The contracts of Concession between the ANP and the IOC that won auction round, and 
thus the right to extract and produce the oil and natural gas, include a Clause of Local 
Content.28 This is included to force the IOC to contribute to the local industry. The 
Clause of Local Content obligates the IOC to utilize the local industry so that, in 
addition to the direct financial compensation given to the HC, the producing country 
can develop its industry and produce jobs in the sector.  
 
The IOCs fulfill these requirements by giving contracts to the local industry and in this 
way actively help them to overcome lack of industrial expertise and educate highly 
trained tehnical personnel. The expected result of applying this clause is to encourage 
technological development, training, and educate human resources. Also the generation 
of jobs and salaries in the respective segment is an important contribution to the wealth 
of the State. According to the clause, the concessionaires must assure preference to 
Brazilian producers whenever the suppliers offer competitive prices, production time, 
and quality, compared to that of other competing international companies.  
                                                 
28 National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels－Resolution n.36,( 23-11-2007), the clause 
establishes that concessionaires commitment as for local acquisition of goods and services shall be 
provide with the ANP.  
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4 Production Sharing Contracts 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With the discovery of large oil reserves in the sub-soil just outside the coast of Brazil, 
the Government felt that the Concession system was not adequate for maintaing the 
Gvernments interest in this area and to guarantee a miximization of the financial output. 
The Production Sharing regime was introduced in this area in order to meat with these 
requirements.  
 
 
Picture: The use of PSC and other regimes throughout the world. Courtesy MacKenzey 
 
4.2 Background of Production Sharing 
The concept of Production Sharing originated in Indonesia where it was first used in 
agriculture. It was later adapted for petroleum in 1966. The concept is now used in 
Peru, Malaysia, Malta, Guatemala, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Angola, China, Qatar, 
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Gabon, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.29 
 
A Production Sharing contract (PSC) is a contract between either a HC or its state oil 
company (NOC) and an international oil company (IOC) by which the latter assumes all 
costs and risks associated with the exploration and production of oil and gas. In the 
event that a commercial discovery is made, the international oil company is entitled to a 
share of the production in order to recover all costs as well as to have a return on the 
investment30.  
 
One of the main objectives of the PSC is to attract multinational companies in the sector 
of oil and gas that are interested and willing to risk capital and utilize technological 
expertise to develop the reserves in the HC.  
 
Considering the strategic and economic importance of the activities involved with E&P 
of hydrocarbons in the vast majority of the oil producing countries, guaranteeing that a 
sufficient part of the produced hydrocarbons end up in the State’s hands is of vital 
importance. This is not only an economic aspect but also evident in the political 
activities involved with the exploration such as nationalism and to gain larger political 
control over the activities.31  
 
4.3 The main Terms and Features 
Under the Concession regime the IOC is the owner of the petroleum extracted from the 
soil. For the PSC, on the other hand, the HC is the owner of the oil. In this way, the 
contributions to the state are no longer through taxes and royalties, but the extracted oil 
is passed on to the state directly. Part of the petroleum is then given to the IOC as a 
compensation for its activities and the risks involved with the exploration.32  
 
                                                 
29 Oil and gas exploration and production reserves, costs, contracts, Paris edition,2004 
30 Bindemann, K. Production-sharing agreements : an economic analysis. Oxford,1999  
31 Smith, Ernest E. International Petroleum Transaction,2 edition, Ed .Rocky Moutain Mineral Law 
Foundation p.448, 2004 
32 Bindemann.K, Production Sharing Agreements: an economic analysis.Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, 1999.  
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The PSC states that the IOC is required to pay a specific amount to the Federal 
Government to get the licitation and the title of ”bonus de signature”. This is required in 
order to explore the areas of petroleum and gas. If petroleum is found in these areas, the 
company will be granted the right to keep a part of the outcome of the production. This 
part of the production is given to the IOC in order to pay all of the cost related to the 
exploration. The exceeding part is called profit oil. This part will be divided between 
the Federal Government and the companies in the contracts, according to the contract 
rules.  
 
Although the oil belongs to the State, the companies take the risks. However, the State 
can also take risks by allowing part of its profit to be used to develop the area. 
Nevertheless, the companies are entitled to recover their investment and the operation 
and maintenance costs. In general, the investment costs are recovered along a certain 
number of years, and the operation and maintenance costs in the same year they incur. 
 
Based on the new regulatory framework in Brazil the Federal Government can perform 
the contract in two different forms: with Petrobras as the only exploring company or as 
a consortium where Petrobras is attributed at least a 30% share.  
 
4.3.1 Definition of PSC 
Production Sharing Contracts are defined in Bill of law 5938/08 as a "regime of 
exploration and production of oil, natural gas and other fluid hydrocarbons" whereby 
oil companies will be granted rights to explore for, develop and produce petroleum 
reserves, at their cost. In the event of a commercial discovery, costs incurred will be 
reimbursed to oil companies through an entitlement to production referred to as "cost 
oil." The remaining petroleum, after deduction of cost oil, is considered "profit oil".33 
This profit oil is shared between the contractor and the Brazilian Government in the 
percentages set forth in the PSC. 
 
                                                 
33 Bill of law (Projeto Lei) 5938-09 wich alter the Law of Oil 9.478/97,would amend Brazil’s Law of 
Hydrocarbons and establish a shared production model for exploration of pre-salt fields 
 25
4.3.2 Parties and Instruments of Contracts  
The legal instrument to be signed between the HC (or the NOC) and the IOCs under the 
Regime of Production Sharing is the Production Sharing Contract. This is the document 
that formally determines the rights and obligations of each part in the contract. There 
are two parties to the contract, a foreign oil company (IOC) and a Government 
representative which can be a head of State, a ministry, or a national oil company 
(NOC). In Brazil, Petrobras conducting the negociations is the most commom case. 
However, it is Petro-Sal34 which will manage the interests of PSC. On the side of the 
foreign contractor we will frequently find joint ventures or consortia rather than 
individual firms. The IOC operates the oil field although many contracts provide for an 
option that allows the NOC to participate directly in the development process. 
 
In spite of variations in the structure of the PSCs that have arisen over the years and in 
different parts of the world, there are a series of applicable basic characteristics 
common to all PSCs. These are:  
a) the HC (or the NOC) chooses the IOC which is given a contract for a specific 
region and a determined duration of time;  
b) the IOC will operate at their own count and risk, under supervision of the HC;  
c) the IOC should supply all the material, equipment, and necessary personnel for 
the conduction of the operations;  
d) the production will belong to the HC;  
e) the IOC has the right to recover their investments from the production in the 
contractually stipulated area;  
f) after the IOC has recovered all costs, the remainder of the production will be 
shared between the IOC and the HC, in proportions previously established in the 
PSC;  
g) the revenue of the IOC are subject of taxation;  
                                                 
34 Bill of law (Projeto lei) 5939/09 would create the PETRO-SAL, a public company under the Ministry 
of Mines and Energy, that would be in charge of managing the Production Sharing agreements 
established for the pre-salt area. 
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h) at the end of the contract the equipment and the installations are transfered to the 
HC.35 
 
4.3.3 Ownership of Production  
In PSC the producing coutries transfer only the exclusive right to conduct the activities 
of exploration and production of the minerals of the subsoil. However, the 
hydrocarbons produced remain the property of the HC (or of the NOC) that hires the 
IOC to perform the exploitation of hydrocarbons.36 In the case of commercial 
feasability of the discovery made by the IOC, the State, as the holder of the 
hydrocarbons produced by the IOC, must refund the costs of the exploitation of the 
reserves ("cost oil") and share between the State (or NOC) and the IOC the remaining 
oil ("profit oil"), in proportions previously agreed in the contractual instrument. 
 
Another characteristic of the PSC, that has also resulted in a change in the activities of 
E&P of hydrocarbons, is a closer participation and control by the State in the segment 
petroleum. Directly or through the National Oil Company (NOC) the State obtains a 
more direct influence in the petroleum sector, obtaining in this way better control and 
closer inspection in these activities.  
 
4.3.4 Ownership of Installation 
A common characteristic of the PSCs is that at the end of the contract, all infrastructure 
shall be transfered to the HC, whitout extra charge. In this context, the Angolan case 
can be used as an illustrative example of common arrangements in the PSCs, article 57 
of the "Law of Oil Activities" (Law 10/2004, of 12 of November of 2004) states 
explicitly that, at the end of the contract, all of the equipment, instruments, material and 
any other property acquired for the operations during the PSC, as well as all the 
information of economic and technical nature should be passed on to the nation 
(Sonangol), without any payment or reimbursement. 37  
                                                 
35 Bill of Law 5938/09 –E.M.I n.00038  article 14. 31/08/09. 
36 Paliashvili, Irina.The concept of Production Sharing, 2008. 
37 República de Angola; “Lei das Actividades Petrolíferas” no 10/2004, de 12 de novembro de 2004. 
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Indonesia’s legislation, as well as Angola’s, also states in art. 20 of its Law of Oil and 
natural gas,38 that all information acquired through the license or by activities of E&P, 
will be the property of the State. The IOCs are permitted to utilize this information only 
during the validity of their contracts. 
 
4.3.5 Responsibilities of IOCs and the Government 
The HC can operate either directly, through its departments, or through agencies. The 
NOC can either act as the organ that grants the rights of E&P to the IOCs, or as the 
organ that is granted the rights together with the IOCs. The IOCs are the investors and 
also the holders of the necessary expertise. The IOCs can either operate blocks 
completely on their own or have a less central role in the activities of exploitation and 
production.  
 
Generally, under this kind of contractual structure, the overall responsibility of the 
control and management of the operations is, in principle, in the hands of the NOC. The 
day-to-day and routine operations, however, are the responsibility of the IOC.  
 
According to chapter 3, section 1 of Law 5938/09 the HC is not responsible for the risks 
imposed during exploration, development, and production under the PSC. The IOC is 
also responsible for the investment costs. However, if the HC desires to do so, it can 
also assume risks by taking on a part of the investment costs.   
 
The PSC does not only impose obligations on the IOCs. There are also some 
responsibilities that the HC should exercise. It does so through the CNPE, ANP and the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy. The CNPE also has certain responsibilities. First of all it 
needs to decide what blocks are to be explored under the PSC regime and for what 
blocks Petrobras will be contracted directly and what blocks that are to be put out for 
auction. The CNPE also determines the technical and economical parts of the contracts, 
                                                 
38 Bindemann, K., Production Sharing Contract: An Economic Analyis”, Ed.”Oxford institute of Energy 
Studies, pp.10, 1999. 
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and is also responsible for the HC’s part of the profit oil.39 It is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy to propose a plan, submitted to CNPE, which includes 
aspects such as signature bonus, minimum participation of Petrobras (at least 30%), 
local content and so on.  
 
Finally, ANP is responsible for organizing and distributing the reserves of the HC. It is 
also responsible for analyzing and approving the IOCs and their exploration plans as 
well as evaluating and inspecting that the IOCs operate according to their plans.  
 
4.3.6 The Government Take 
Under the PSC regime, the IOCs bear the risks and, as a compensation, have the right to 
divide the oil produced with the State. In PSCs, the HC pays for these services with the 
oil extracted. However, the part that ends up in the hands of the state is in general more 
than half the production. This division of the production between the parts is the main 
source of income for the producing country in the PSC regime. 
 
The main difference between PSC and Concession when it comes to Government 
participation, is that as a general rule in the PSC there is no payment of royalties. 
According to article 42 one of the government takes under the PSC is royalty, which 
can be considered a compensation for the exploration of oil. However, there might be 
other forms of payment (bonus payments) and taxes in the PSCs. These vary according 
to creativity and opportunity of the legislator of each country, and may incurre at the 
time of:  
a) the discovery; 
b) the statement of marketability;  
c) the submission of the Plan of Development;  
d) the start of production of the output; 
e) after a determined (accumulated) volume has been produced or, 
f)  after a determined quota of daily production has been reached. 
 
                                                 
39 Law of oil 5938/09, section II, article 9, no. I-VII.  
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4.4 Comparison between Countries which utilize PSC  
In this section we will take a closer look at two countries that use the PSC regime 
namely Angola and Indonesia. Under the Angolan law ”the oil operation can only be 
exercided through a licence of prospection or Concession according to article 6”.40 
However, the Concession area is to be explored excluvisly by Sonangol41, which under 
the terms of the law is the national Concessionare. The Concessions granted to the NOC 
are obtained through a law determined by the minister. By analyzing the Angolan 
model, we find that the IOCs generally interpret the model utilized to be closer to the 
PSC,42 because it is through these instruments that the relation between the IOC and the 
Agolan State are materialized. The law opens for the utilization of three regimes; 
Concession, Joint Venture, and PSC. Sonangol has utilized only the Production Sharing 
Contract, however, when interacting with the IOC. 
 
The main characteristic of the Angolan PSC is that it has a specific taxation on the oil 
activities under the law 13/2004.43 The law applies to all international and national 
companies which exercise oil activities in the Angolian territory.44  
 
In Angola and Indosesia, royalties are not paid. However, the tax income is set to 50%. 
Angola has, at present time, a specific taxation of the oil producing activities, governed 
by the Law 13/2004 for the "Taxation of the Oil-producing Activities”. The limit of 
"cost oil" in Angola is set in 50%, while in countries like Nigeria such a limit does not 
exist. In others countries like Qatar, Gabon and Ivory Coast it is far lower, representing 
about 30%. Even though the Signature Bonus needs to be paid in Angola, the simple 
fact that Angola is the only large oil producing country in Africa that utilizes the “rate 
of return” as a basis of calculation of the "profit oil", makes Angola a very attractive 
investment. Angola can be considered attractive also compared to other African 
countries where the royalties arrive at 20%, but where the "profit oil” is calculated 
                                                 
40 See Angolan Law of Oil 13/78, article 6. 
41 The Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola or Sonangol was created in 1976 as the national 
oil company of Angola. It is 100% owned by the State and serves as the business arm of the Angolan 
Government, being responsible for co-ordinating and controlling all petroleum activities. The enactment 
of the Petroleum Law (Law 13 of 1978) made Sonangol the sole concessionaire for oil exploration and 
production in the country. (http://www.mbendi.com/cosg.htm, downloaded 01.10.2010) 
42 See Angolan Law of Oil 13/78, article 14. 
43 See Angolan Law of Oil 13/78, c/c Law 13/2004 
44 www.minfin/gv  .Downloaded 09/2010 
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based on the total volume produced. 
 
In Indonesia, for example, there exists a system called "First Tranch Petroleum" (FTP), 
45by which the first 20% of the production should be divided between the IOC and the 
NOC in percentages similar to that of the "profit oil". Even though there is no limit on 
how much of the production can be written off as investment and production costs in 
Indonesia, i.e., there is no limit on the "cost oil", this recuperation can only be taken 
from 80% of the production. The remaining petroleum, i.e., the "profit oil", is divided 
proportions between 65/35 and 55/45 between the NOC and the company hired, 
respectively. In addition, Indonesia, in general, requires the Signature Bonus and 
Production Bonus to be paid.  
 
We will now discuss the models used in Anogla and Indonesia in somewhat more 
detail. These countries were chosen because they were the first to introduce the PSC 
regime among the principal oil producing countries. They are thus important to study 
because of their long experience with the regime.  
 
4.4.1 Indonesia 
Indonesia was the first country to adopt the PSC. Over the lase decades, the production 
in Indonesia has been in strong decline, accompanied of a considerable growth in the 
consumption, something that has transformed the country to an importer of 
hydrocarbons. In the first half of year 2000, the legal regulatory structure was altered, in 
an attempt of revert this situation.  
 
The main change was to create regulating agencies in order to decentralize the power of 
Pertamina (the stately owned oil company), that was known as bureaucratic and 
inefficient. This modification brought with it more legal security to the system by 
removing the regulatory and economic responsibilities from the hands of the NOCs. 
However, the change in the regulatory regime related to the activities of oil and gas in 
the country has yet not resulted in an increase in the production of hydrocarbons.  
                                                 
45 FTP, First Tranch Petroleum, (works  as a cap on cost recovery.Futhermore the third generation 
contracts introduced improved incentives for marginal fields. 
 31
 
A peculiarity of Indonesian system is that from this law was put into action in 2001, it 
tis the Regulating Agency of the upstream activities (BP MIGAS) that signs the 
Production Sharing Contracts. Furthermore, the system of how the oil is shared in 
Indonesia is “variable scaling”, i.e., an increase in the volume produced will result in a 
larger relative take to the Government. In this way the take of the IOCs during the 
initial phase is guaranteed by giving them a larger share, and the maximization of the 
Government take is guaranteed with the continuing and presumably increasing 
production in the field.  
 
4.4.2 Angola 
As the PSC regime implemented in Indonesia was not a big success, and the strategy to 
adopt the PSC in Russia was not fruitful (only four blocks in operation under this 
system), Angola does probably represent the case where the PSC has functioned best. 
The country is also the only big exporting country that utilizes contracts of PSC and 
"rate of return" (ROR)46, which can be a factor of attractiveness to the IOCs, especially 
when the prices are below commodity.  
 
Production sharing contracts which used to be based on varying rates at different 
production thresholds have now mainly been replaced by rate of return based contracts. 
Such contracts are awarded to the company which offers the lowest rate of return on the 
Concession. This has the merit of effectively capping the reward to the IOC when oil 
prices are very high and maximising the rent to the host Government.47 Therefore, even 
in the event of exploration success, it is very unlikely that these companies will add 
shareholder value from the Concessions they were awarded. 
 
Another aspect in the Angolan PSC is the possibility through specific licenses to choose 
the operator and participating IOCs. There is also another form of license involving 
small companies or companies controlled by Angolan citizens. The objective of these 
                                                 
46 Rate of return: The rate of return on an investment, expressed as a percentage of the total amount 
invested. Rate of return is usually, but not always, calculated annually. also called return. 
47 Fiscal Tighetening:Striking the Rights Balance, Oxford Energy Forum  
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licences is to contribute to the development of small local companies. The idea behind 
these licences is thus similar to the “local content” found in Brazil, although applied 
somewhat differently.    
 
The Angola also practices "satisfaction of the needs of internal consumption". This is 
done in order to guarantee an eventual national demand of hydrocarbons. Thus, if the 
national demand is such that a larger part of the oil production is needed to satisfy it, the 
Government can take a larger cut. Such a sale should be carried out by fair market 
prices, determined by the Government. The Ministry of Industry of Petroleum Angola, 
MINPET48 determines the quantity that Sonangol and the IOCs are obliged to sell to the 
State.  
 
4.5 The IOC’s Take: Cost Oil 
The three most important elements of Production Sharing contracts are cost recovery, a 
production split between the Government and the Oil Company, and income tax. 
 
In a Production Sharing Contract the IOC has the right to recover its costs by an 
appropriate proportion of the produced oil. This proportion is known as the cost oil. The 
cost oil is valued using the market price of crude oil before being compared with the 
recoverable costs.49 
 
There are different types of Production Sharing, but roughly speaking they can be 
divided into two main categories:  
a) the "Indonesian model" of PSC, where the IOC first receives first a part of the 
production destined to reimburse it of the costs and expenses, and then after 
recuperation of the costs, a percentage of the remainder of the production;  
b) the "Peruvian model" of PSC, in which the IOC receives a determined percentage 
of the production as payment for the costs, expenses and profit.  
                                                 
48 MINPET designated short, is the organ of the Central Administration of the State authority that the 
sector of Petroleum being responsible for the implementation of national policy and for coordinating, 
monitoring and control of all oil.The main purposes of MINPET are  promoting the structuring of the 
Petroleum Sector; 
Coordinate, supervise, monitor and control the activities in the field of petroleum; 
49 IFP.Publication, Oil and gas exploration production  
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It is important to define the costs that the IOC can consider a part of the exploration and 
production costs, and how the IOC can recover this cost through the cost oil. In order to 
understand the process where the IOC recovers the costs we analize the following 
aspects: 
a) what kind of investment is to be reimbursed to the IOC;  
b) if any interest or bonus is to be added to these costs;  
c) how the costs are to be reimbursed;  
d) how big a part of the production is given to the HC during this period of 
recovery of the costs;  
e) if royalties, bonus, and tributes are to be discounted from one or both parts 
and; finally,  
f) what happens after IOC has been entirely reimbursed of his exploratory 
costs.  
 
Production Sharing Contracts do not generally provide for the payment of royalty on 
production, but in the case that royalty is paid, the cost oil is calculated on the 
production remaining after royalty. 
 
4.6 Sharing of Production－Profit Oil Split 
The proportion of the oil left after deduction of cost oil is known as the profit oil. The 
way the profit oil is shared depends on the contract rules. However, under the 
international rules, the profit oil is shared between the State and the IOC has changed 
substantially over the past 40 years.50 
 
There are many systems of sharing the "profit oil", the main are:  
a) a fixed proportion is given to the IOC and the HC, as in Indonesia (for example 
85% to the State and 15% to the IOC);  
                                                 
50 Johnston, D. International Petroleum fiscal systems and Production Sharing contracts, Pennwell, 1994. 
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b) a progressive share based or in the daily production or an accumulation of the 
production, for example giving a larger share to the HC when the production is 
large;  
c) the share of the production given to the IOC and the State varies according to 
the profitability of the operations, depending on whether, for example, the 
production is onshore or offshore, whether oil or gas is produces, and so on.  
 Another possibility in the PSC regime is the possibility to create a provision or reserve 
in case of fluctuations in the oil price. This reserve is created in order maximize the 
share of the HC. 
 
The PSCs are distributed through a bidding process where all the interested companies 
will propose a certain percentage of profit oil－equal or higher than the minimum 
fraction determined by law－and the company that puts forward the highest percentage 
of profit oil will win the contract. Once a company has been given the right to explore 
for oil, it has to pay a 10% royalty in addition to a special participation fee (SPF) that 
lies between zero and 40%.  
 
4.7 Petro-Sal － Managing Brazil’s Interests 
A public company called Petro-sal will be constructed in order to manage the PSCs on 
behalf of the Brazilian government. The company will be organized as a corporation 
under the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Under the PSC system, Brazil’s state-
controlled oil company Petrobras will be the operator of all contracts for exploration 
and production of the Pre-salt layer. Interested parties can seek contracts through a 
partnership agreement. 
 
According to article 17351 of the Brazilian Constitution, this new company is bound by 
the same legislation as private companies. This includes labour law, commercial law 
                                                 
51 See article 173, Brazilian Federal Constitution .Article 173.  
ART.173 With the exception of the cases set forth in this Constitution, the direct exploitation of an 
economic activity by the State shall only be allowed whenever needed to the imperative necessities of the 
national security or to a relevant collective interest, as defined by law. 
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and tax law. The Norwegian example Petoro served as a model for the Brazilian Petro-
Sal. For example, both Petoro and Petro-Sal have to assume risks and financial costs 
related with the activities of E&P.  
 
In addition to the roles mentioned above, Petro-Sal will be responsible for the 
following: 
a) conducting the management, audit, and inspecting and supervising of petroleum 
activities performed under PSCs; 
b) authorizing the bidding processes related to the exploration and production of 
pre-salt areas; 
c) representing the Government, through the operational committees, in 
consortiums incorporated for the execution of PSCs; and 
d) representing the Government in case of unitization in the pre-salt and strategic 
areas.52 
 
Another important question to address in this setting is what role this new company is 
to have. The idea is not to create a "second Petrobras", or in other words, a new stately 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Paragraph 1 - The law shall establish the juridical estatute of the public company, the mixed capital 
company and their subsidiaries which explore economic activity of production or trading of goods or 
rendering of services, with provisions for: 
I - their social function and the ways of accounting by the State and society; 
II - the compliance with the legislation proper of the private companies, including as regards to civil, 
commercial, labor and tax rights and duties; 
III - bidding and contracting of buildings, services, purchases and sales, with observance to the principles 
of public administration; 
IV - the constitution and functioning of their administrative and fiscal councils, with participation of 
minor stock holders; 
V - the terms, the performance evaluations and the liabilities of the administrators. 
Paragraph 2 - The public companies and the mixed-capital companies may not enjoy fiscal privileges 
which are not extended to companies of the private sector.  
Paragraph 3 - The law shall regulate the relationships of public companies with the State and society.  
Paragraph 4 - The law shall repress the abuse of economic power that aims at the domination of markets, 
the elimination of competition and the arbitrary increase of profits.  
Paragraph 5 - The law shall, without prejudice to the individual liability of the managing officers of a 
legal entity, establish the liability of the latter, subjecting it to punishments compatible 
 
 
52 Bill of Law 5.941/09,this law makes Petrobras the sole operator in new pre-salt areas and addresses, 
amoung other issues, the capitalization of Petrobras. 
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controlled IOC which is involved with the operational part of the production. The need 
for capital, resources and technology would render it useless any attempt of this new 
agent to obtain success in the activity of E&P. Besides, for the new company to adapt a 
more regolarory role would put it in direct conflict with the rights of the ANP. 
Therefore, it is recommendable to give Petro-Sal53 the role as a non-operational 
investor. As not-operational investor, it is understood that the new public agent can 
participate in any operation, only in partnership with an IOC, that being a state-owned 
or private IOC.  
 
The comparison of different countries shows that some countries have adopted this new 
agent (such as Petro-Sal). However, the role of this company is not always restricted to 
the investor role. In Angola, for example, Sonangol sometimes exercises the role of not-
operational investor, while NNPC in Nigeria and Petoro54 in Norway have very 
restricted roles as not-operational investors.  
 
On the basis of these experiences, we can draw an early conclusion that the State can 
fulfill its objectives to participate in the operations (either as an operator or as a mere 
investor). This is possible without adopting the contractual instruments for sharing the 
production. Licenses are for example utilized to regulate the participation of Petoro in 
Norway, while Nigeria utilize PSC, as well as others mechanisms depending on the 
field in question (like Concession contracts and instruments that are typically found in 
joint ventures regimes, such as the Memorandum of Understanding).  
 
We will elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages that the creation of this new 
company in Brazil will bring with it. The main advantages of introducing this public 
company (Petro-Sal) are the following:  
a) The public company can serve as a tool for the State in the sense that it can 
establish and exercise the State’s participation as an investor in the pre-salt. It 
                                                 
53 Bill of Law 5938/07, c/c E.M.I- n-00038- according to article 31 explain that the State can through 
Petro-Sal contract directly Petrobras, which it will comercialiaze de share exeeced of oil. 
54 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,(NNPC) is the state oil corporation through which the federal 
Government of Nigeria regulates and participates in the country's petroleum industry. Petoro, a company 
wholly owned by the state of Norway, manages Norwegian offshore oil and natural gas properties, State's 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), on behalf of the Government. 
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can do this, independently of the licitation process for choosing the IOCs that 
will enter in partnership with the public company, i.e., assume a minimum 
percentage of participation of the block. Before the introduction of Petro-Sal, 
the participation of the State as investor in the segment of E&P was through its 
stock share in Petrobras, as concessionaire. In this way, as the participation of 
Petrobras was directly dependent on its financial interest and of its success in 
the licitation process, the State’s involvement is subject to a competitive aution 
process and can, at least in theory, be marginalized as a part in the exploitation 
of the pre-salt;  
b) The public company enables the State to establish an economically intelligent 
participation through by prioritating the blocks with the highest potential 
economic gains. To acheive this it is necessary create mechanisms that makes it 
possible to enter blocks after exploratory phase, reducing the State’s risk in the 
initial period55;  
c) The role of the public company is thus to participate only in the blocks of 
interest to the State, signing not just the contract of the respective Concession, 
but also interacting directly with the IOCs, through typical contractual 
instruments of the petroleum industry, sharing responsibilities such as necessary 
investments and the projects of E&P with the IOCs;  
d) As the State’s tool for investing, the public company’s main function is:  
i. a primary function as receiver of the resources that are to be 
invested in the activities of E&P and; 
ii. the company is also a canalizer of fundings to the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, that is to be created. The specific law describing 
the creation of this fund will define the fund’s purposes, 
including the rules of how the income is distributed between the 
public company and the fund. 
e) The public company can also have other functions and tasks. It can for example 
be used as a political tool to for example control the operation of each block.  
                                                 
55Bill of Law, 5939/07- describes all main aspects  
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f) In addition, the public company can serve as an instrument for creation of 
specific rules of Governmental remuneration. For example, the activities of E&P 
of a block are granted the winning bidder, which can be a company or a 
consortium of companies.  
 
Following are some of the main disadvantages that the creation of the public company, 
Petro-Sal may bring with it:  
a) The public company can block the development of the pre-salt, due to possible 
limitations in its capacity of indebtedness, tied by the limited capacity to offer 
financial guarantees.  
b) highly qualified labour is necessary for the formation of the public company, 
which may come at the expence of other parts of the sector;  
c) the participation of a public company in the process can generate conflicts of 
interests, especially regarding the role of the public company when interacting 
with already existing Governmental entities;  
d) the strategy of the IOCs during the auctions, mainly in respects to the value of 
the Signature bonus, may change in the presence of a public company. It may 
even be difficult to confirm the attractiveness of the investment with the 
presence of a public company;  
e) there will also be an increasing complexity in the analysis of the IOCs that take 
part in the licitation process;   
f) a larger political risk. This may reduce the attractiveness for the IOCs to invest 
in the sector. 
 
The decision of state-owned participation in the public sector should therefore take 
into account the possible advantages and disadvantages associated with such a 
change in the system.  
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5 Comparative Regulatory Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to compare the regimes, it is important take into consideration not only the 
fiscal aspects of a particular system, but also how effective it addresses the different 
phases of the operation. Another aspects such as how important the oil is to the 
economy of the country should also be taken into consideration.  
 
The regime utilized in Brazil is the Concession. This is a legal-regulatory regime where 
one or more national or foreign IOCs are given the exclusive rights to the exploitation 
and production of hydrocarbons, by its count and risk, in a determined area. The IOCs, 
if petroleum is found, become the holders of the production and are then able to dispose 
the petroleum freely, subject to a set of rules set forth in the contract and in the 
applicable legislation.  
 
A new regulatory framework was introduced in the Brazilian sub-soil through the 
Production Sharing contract (PSC). Also in this case the Host Country grants to the IOC 
the exclusive right to conduct activities of exploitation at his own risk and cost. In this 
case, however, the IOC receives a part of the hydrocarbons produced as a form of 
compensation. Thus, when it comes to the risk aspect, there is not clear distinction 
between the PSC and the Regime of the Concession, but when it comes to who owns 
the oil, and how the oil is shared between the HC and the IOC, there is a clear 
difference. In this chapter, a comparative analysis between the Concession and PSC will 
be brought i to discussion.  
 
5.2 The Exploration Phase  
The Exploration phase is considered the most important phase, since future 
developments depend upon its success. The Government’s interest is to secure rapid 
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and comprehensive exploration. Also, when the companies do not make any discovery 
or decide not to conduct any futher exploration, the Government will reasume control 
over the areas. 56 
 
The are some provisions which the Government has adopted in order to protect their 
interests during the exploration phase, such as a minimum work programme, minimum 
expenditure obligations, requirement to supply all information acquired by the company 
in the course of exploration to the Government, and madatory relinquishment. 
 
By comparing the contracts utilizes we can draw some conclusions regarding the PSC 
contract utilized by Sonangol in Angola, and compare this to the Brazilian Concession 
regime. When it comes to supplyng the Government with geological and geophysical 
data gathered during exploration, in the case of the Brazilian Concession, “the 
geological, geophysical and geochemical data and information are an integral part of 
national oil resources and shall be deliverd to the ANP”57 In the PSC case taken from 
Angola “the Contractor Group shall provide Sonangol with copies of any and all data 
related to the Contract Area, including, but not limired to, geological and geophysical 
reports”58 
 
Regarding the minimum work obligation imposed on the company there are two 
different perspectives of each system. In the Brazilian Concession, “minimum 
exploratory program”, means the work program set forth in Annex II - work and 
investment program, to be mandatorily accomplished by the Concessionare within the 
exploration phase pursuant to paragraph 5.959 In PSC case, the Angolan system sets out 
work obligations such as seismic surveys and drilling wells to be accomplished during 
the exploration phase.60 
 
                                                 
56 Hossain, K. 1979 (Law and policy in petroleum development:changing relation betewwen 
transnationals and Governments)  
57 see clause 17.2 of the Brazilian Concession Agreement (Annex 1) 
58 see clause 24.3 of Angolan Production Sharing Contract (2006) 
59 see clause 5.9 of the Brazilian Concession Agreement (Annex1) 
60 see clause 15 of Angolan Production Sharing Contract (2006) 
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Another difference in regard to the exploration phase is if the company is required to 
furnish a performance bond to guarantee a certain performance of its obligation. In the 
Braziian Concession Agreement it states that, “the concessionaire shall, at its own cost 
and risk, provide the ANP one or more securities for the Minimum Exploratory 
Program (MEP), in the form irrevocable letters of credit, garantee insurance.”61 On the 
other hand, in the PSC of Angolan Sonagol we have “the minimum exploration work 
obligation shal be secured by a financial guarantee”.62 
 
A last example is to what extent the company is required to progressivily either 
relinquish or reduce the area held by it for purposes of exploration. In the interpretation 
of the Brazilian Concession we find, ”no later than October 31 of each calendar year, 
the Concessionare shall deliver the Annual Production Program for each Filed to the 
ANP, in accordance with the Develpoment Plan for the Field”63- The concessionaire 
needs ANP’s approval to proceed with the production. In the PSC, ”if at the end of the 
first Exploration Phase, the contracts elect, pusuant to article 3.4 to continue 
exploration and operation in the contract area in the second exploration phase, the 
contractor shall retain up to sixty per cent (60%).”64 
 
5.3 Development Phase 
In both regimes there are different conditions in order to fulfill the companies’ 
obligations in the development phase. Firstly the provisions require the company to 
relinquish the area of any discovery if it does not want or is unable to develop, and in 
this way, allowing the Government to develop it through its own resources or in 
participation with another company.65 
 
In order to determine whether the discovery is commercial or not, and the following 
prodecures in each case we analyse the contract form of both regimes to understand the 
main differences. The Brazilian Concession case states that ”prior to the end of the 
                                                 
61 see clause 15.1 of the Brazilian Concession(Annex1) 
62 see clause 15,15.6 and 20 of the Angolan Production Sharing Contracts(2006) 
63 see clause 10.2 of the Brazilian Concession (Annex 1) 
64 see clause 4.1 of the Indian Producting Sharing Contracts(2007) 
65 Hossain, K. 1979 (Law and policy in petroleum development:changing relation beteween 
transnationals and Governments) 
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exploration phase, the concessionaire may, by means of notification to the ANP, at its 
own discretion, issue a Declaration of Commerciability for the discovery in accordance 
with the Evaluation Plan approved by the ANP”66 
 
According to PSC, “if and when a discovery is made within the contract area, the 
contractor shall run tests promptly and in any case within 90 days from the date under 
article 10.1 in order to determine whether the discovery is of potential interest or not.67 
 
5.4 Production Phase 
After a reservoir has been discovered, the next stage is the production. The interest of 
Governments and companies may diverge with respect to rates and levels of production, 
and also with regard to adoption of production methods. By analysing both contracts we 
can state some differences with regard to the control that the Government has over the 
decision and policies relating to production. 
 
In the Brazilian Concession regime the Concessionare shall, at its own cost and risk, 
“provide the ANP one or more securities for the Mininum Exploraty Program (MEP), 
in the form of irrevocable letters of credit, guarantee insurance.”68 However, in the 
PSC, “the management committee, when considering any work programme and budget, 
may require the contractor to prepare an estimate of potential production to be 
achieved through the implementation of the work Programme and budget for each of 
the three years”.69 
 
5.5 Ownership of Production  
The property of the hydrocarbons is one of the main elements which differentiate the 
existing legal regulatory regimes. This difference is therefore also important in order to 
understand other characteristics, as remuneration of the State and responsibilities of the 
parts involved. Under the Concession regime it is very simple to know where and when 
                                                 
66 see clause 7.1 of the Brazilian Concession (Annex1) 
67 see clause 10 of the Indian Production Sharing Contract (2007) 
68 see clause 15.1 of the Brazilian Concession (Annex1) 
69 see clause 10.11 of the Indian Production Sharing Contract (2007) 
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the title to hydrocarbons is passed from the State to the IOC since that happens at the 
wellhead. In this sense, hydrocarbons underground will belong to the State, but when it 
reaches the wellhead it automatically passes to the IOC.70 
 
The distinction between the regulatory legal regimes when it comes to the property of 
the hydrocarbons occurs when the hydrocarbon is extracted. In the Concession, the 
hydrocarbons extracted are passed on to the IOC. In the PSC, the petroleum is always 
the property of the HC, in this way a part of the production is delivered to the IOC on 
the basis of compensation for the risk run in the exploitation and for the investments 
made in the contractual phases.  
 
We will meantion briefly also the other regimes used in the Brazil, in order to 
demonstrate both the similarity and differences between all four regimes. In the case 
Contract of Service (with clause of risk), the IOC can be paid with part of the 
production or with discounting in the price of purchase of the barrel of the oil produced, 
but the production will always be the HC’s property. In The Joint Venture, the 
production is shared between the HC and the IOC, in the proportion of its respective 
participations. 
 
5.6 The Contract between HC and IOC  
As a starting point, the main difference in relation to the legal aspects between the 
analyzed regimes is the legal instrument made between the HC and to IOC. Therefore, 
each regime has its typical legal instrument. Likewise, these contracts reflect the legal-
constitutional framework and the regulation of how the State needs to act with respect 
to the oil industry. In this way, the contracts that materialize each regime are: 
 In the Concession, the contracts of Concession, licence contracts and the lease. 
 In the PSC, the contracts of sharing of production.  
 In the contract of service, the service installment contracts, with or without 
clause of risk 
 
                                                 
70 Bunter, M.A.G., The promotion and licensing of petroleum prospective acreage.The Hague; London, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
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In relation to the methods used in order to obtain remuneration in the different regimes, 
we can consider that in case of Concession the Government participation comes in 
royaties. On the other hand, in PSC the remuneration process is materialized through 
the sharing of profit oil. In the Service Contract, the income arrives through selling the 
produced oil. Finally, in the joint venture case it comes through the share of the profit of 
the operation to the attributed state.  
 
5.7 Responsibilities and Function of IOC and HC 
This section is related with the way the IOC acts in each producing country and with the 
level of involvement of the country in the activity of E&P. The responsibility to have 
sufficient expertise in order to perform the exploitation and production is an obligation 
of the IOCs.71 This obligation depends, however, on whether the IOC is the only 
company reponsible for the area of actuation or if it is working in cooperation with the 
State.  
 
In regard to the resoponsibilities of the HC there are some main differences in the 
regimes. In the Concession, for example, the role of the state is to regulate and inspect 
the activities of E&P performed by the IOCs. In the PSC, however, the State not only 
regulates and inspects, but also acts directly in the activities of E&P, through the NOC, 
which can be the operator or not. This shows that in the PSC the Government can 
interact together with the IOC. Differently, for the contract of service the State has the 
lawful prerogative to act directly in the activity through its NOC, and can also 
subcontract companies with expertise in the diverse operational activities of E&P. 
  
In most cases the State manages its functions through a department of oil or department 
of energy. The main function of the Sate in this contest is to inspect, supervise and 
monitor the activities concerning the oil industry. However, in countries where the 
State’s only function is to supervise and monitor, it is usually created technical 
Government agencies in order to exercise these activities. On the other hand, in 
                                                 
71 Bill of Law 5.938/07, accoeding to section I article 6 
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countries in which the State is more directly involved in the activities of E&P, the 
NOCs have a prominent role, and in some cases also take on a supervising role. 
 
Regarding the risk of the activity assumed by the State in relation with the Concession 
regime, the State does not run exploratory risk nor a commercial risk when the oil is 
sold, as the IOC has the exclusive right to explore, extract, and trade the production.72 
 
Also in the Production Sharing Contract, the State does not run the exploratory risk, but 
it falls on the IOC to deal with all of the costs and carry out the necessary investments 
to explore and develop the field and produce hydrocarbons, being reimbursed through 
the cost oil. In the case of Production Sharing contracts the State does, however, 
patrially assume the commercial risk, since the State gets its share of the production 
(profil oil), which it needs to sell to the market, and in this way assuming all the risk 
involved with fluctuations in the market price and so on.  
 
Finally, in Contracts of Service, when the State signs a contract of service with clause 
of risk, the exploratory risk is contractually transfered to the IOC. If there is no clause, 
however, the State assumes all the exploratory risk. As regards to the commercial risk, 
this is transferred to the State, which is the unique and exclusive holder of the 
hydrocarbons produced. 
 
5.8 Ownership of E&P Installation  
There are four types of regimes regarding the properties utilized during Exploration and 
Production (E&P):  
a) the installation is originally the property of the HC both before and after E&P;  
b) the installation is property of the IOC and then transferred to the HC at the end 
of the contractual period;  
c) the installation is shared property between the HC and IOC, at a predetermined 
percentage belonging to each part. In case of Joint Ventures, the installations are 
transferred to the HC at the end of the contractual period.  
                                                 
72 Bill of Law 5.938/97 states that the State will not assume any risk related with  activities of 
exploration, production and development. 
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d) the installation is property of the IOC, without the possibility of transferring the 
installations to the HC. 
 
As example of a property regime that is not characterized by the adopted model is found 
in Indonesia, where the PSC is applied and the installations and equipment acquired by 
the IOC are automatically transferred back to the State, at the beginning of its 
utilization. On the other hand, in the PSCs in Angola, the IOCs acquire the equipment 
utilized in the activities and these are then transferred to the HC only at the end of the 
contractual term. In case of Venezuela, that adopts the regime of Joint Ventures, the oil 
companies are holders of the assets as long as they are active, but must, however, 
transfer all of the assets to the HC at the termination of the project.  
 
As general rule in the regime of Concession the property of the assets is transfered to 
the HC only at the end of the contract, by means of public interest.  
 
5.9 Political Appeal 
PSCs were first used in Indonesia in the 1960s, according to the Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, to boost the power of the Governments that felt oil companies always 
had advantage in Concession systems. The switch to PSC reversed the traditional 
relationship at the time by making the Government the owner of the oil. 
 
This distinction does not guarantee a greater percentage of the earnings to the state, but 
it is politically appealing to leaders who want to show they are in control of national 
resources. The political element has been a key part of Lula's drive for PSCs, with 
supporters frequently repeating the mantra "Subsalt is ours." 
 
5.10 Timing of Payments 
In Concession regimes, companies frequently make large up-front payments－often in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars－during bidding rounds to boost their chances of 
winning rights to a field. This can be advantageous to Governments if they face budget 
shortfalls. 
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 PSCs generally spread payments out over the life of the project. They may also include 
signing bonuses, though these are much smaller than in Concession systems. 
 
5.11 Booking Reserves 
Oil companies must tell investors how much oil they have access to, because this is a 
key indicator of their ability to maintain production and therefore revenues. Companies 
generally prefer Concession systems because this system allows the company to list all 
the reserves in its books. In a PSC, it can list only the barrels it keeps. Thus if a 
company agrees to give the Government 70 percent of the oil from a field, it can book 
only the remaining 30 percent. 
 
5.12 Institutional Framework 
Countries with limited oil field experience and weak state institutions often use PSCs 
because they are simple to create and require less Government supervision than a 
Concession system. They are frequently used by poor nations in Africa and Central 
Asia with unstable Governments and weak rules of law. Countries with greater oil 
industry expertise and tax collection capacity, such as in the United States and Norway, 
tend to use Concession. 73 
 
5.13  Overview and Conclusion 
The principle advantage for the HC, and also the main disadvantage for the IOC, under 
both the Concession and the PSA is that the investment of the IOC is not re-imbursed if 
petroleum is not found. Thus, the Concession regime represents more stability than the 
PSC regime for the IOCs in the initial phase.  
 
It is clear that the Brazilian Concession regime and the Production Sharing Contract 
mostly have the same features and that they can be designed to achieve the same results. 
There are a few important differences, however. Under the PSC regime the IOC acts as 
                                                 
73 Reports by Brian Ellsworth 
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a service-provider for the HC. This means that the Government can exercise a greater 
control over the oil companies than under the Concession regime.  
 
Another difference between the PSC and the Concession arizes due to the fact that the 
PSC are self-contained. In other words, under the PSA, the relations between the HC 
and the IOC is contractual. Thus, in countries with low institutional maturity or 
frequently changing legislation, the IOCs tend to prefer PSC because of increased 
stability and predictability: A change in the legislation will not affect the conditions 
under which the IOC operates to the same extent as under the Concession regime. 
Brazil, however, must be considered a mature country in this setting, and in terms of 
stability, the Concession is just as predictable as PSC.  
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6 Comparative Fiscal Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The fiscal mechanisms found in both the Concession and the PSC are signature and 
production bonuses, royaties, income tax and Government participation. Even though 
the petroleum policies may be different from country to country, most of them are 
derived with the objective to maximize the reveneus and minimize the finacial risk 
during petroleum operations.74 
 
There are several forms in which the producing country can obtain remuneration in the 
oil industry, especially in the upstream sector. The main mechanisms for the 
remuneration to the Government are:  
a) the bonus to be paid by the IOC for determined events;  
b) rent of the area to be paid to the holder of the land for the use during the period 
of operation (in the phase of exploitation or production), or payments by the 
retention of offshore area;  
c) royalties on the production;  
d) special remuneration on extraordinary profits of the IOC;  
e) division of the profit oil;  
f) taxes on the profit, which are directly affected by the income earned by the IOC 
during the period of production of the fields 
The different regulatory systems will use some or all of these mechanisms to guarantee 
the Government takes.  
 
6.2 Signature and Production Bonuses 
Some Concession agreements and PSCs require the concessionaire/contractor to pay a 
                                                 
74 Johnston, D., International petroleum fiscal systems and Production Sharing contracts. 
Tulsa.Okla,PennWell, 1994. 
 50
"bonus" on the date that the contract is signed or the license is granted. This bonus 
represents a very attractive form of revenue for the HC. Production bonuses are paid to 
the Government when production first reaches a given level, set out in the contract. 
 
6.3 Royalties 
The methods used to obtain remuneration in the different regimes vary. In case of 
Concession the Government participation comes in royaties. One the other hand, in PSC 
the remuneration process is materialized through the sharing the profit oil. The concept 
of royalty is not normally found in the PSC because of the issue of ownership. This is 
why many PSCs do not have royalty provisions. However, it is possible to find PSCs 
with royalties incorporated in their fiscal system. In Brazil, this is for example the case 
in Law 5938/09 which allows for royalties to be utilized as a revenue to compensate for 
the exploration of the petroleum. This provision is found in article 42 of Law 5938/09. 
Thus, the rules concerning royalties in the Concession system (Law 9.478/97) will 
remain also in the new PSC system until a new regulatory system is in place.  
 
Royalties are interesting to Governments because they secure an upfront payment as 
soon as production starts. This is very important, especially in the Concession system 
when the company may be in a non-taxpayer position for income tax purposes during 
the first yers of production. However, in the PSC case, the role of the royalty 
mechanism is not that important since the cost recovery limit mechanism will guarantee 
revenues for the Government during the first years of production also when the 
company is a non-taxpayer position.75 
 
In the Service Contract, the income is obtained by selling the produced oil. Finally, in 
the joint venture case, it comes through the share of profit of the operation.  
 
                                                 
75 Nakhle,C., Petroleum taxation: sharing the oil welth: a study of petroleum taxation yesterday, today 
and tomorrow. Abingdon, Routledge, 2008. 
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6.4 Income Tax 
Income tax is found in both the Concession and the PSC regimes. However, its 
importance in the Concession regime is greater than in the PSC regime as it is the main 
source of revenues to the Government. In the PSC regime the role of income tax is 
outweighed by the Government profit oil. 
 
6.5 Overview and Conclusion 
Brazil has a Concession regime that has achieved good results and has had a very 
efficient fiscal system which has contributed to the development of the industry in the 
country. The main idea of PSC is the sharing of production and not profit. Although 
companies under a modern PSC regime are also subject to royalties and taxes, the 
principal source of revenues for the HC is the split of production.  
 
Under a Concession regime the HC receives its share through taxation and royalties. 
One might say that the Concession regime uses the concept of profit sharing through 
royalties and taxes while a PSC regime uses the concepts of production sharing. In fact, 
there is not all that much difference between the two regimes when we consider the 
economic aspects, partly because both regimes utilize royalties, taxes and bonuses. Both 
systems are thus likely to produce the same economical results76. Comparing the 
regimes from an economic perperctive, it is thus probable that one arrives at similar 
Government takes regardless of what contract is in force. At this stage we might 
conclude that in order to reach a certain Government take, there is no need to change to 
the PSC regime in Brazil as a mere alteration of the Concession regime would obtain 
the same result.   
                                                 
76 Johnston, D., International petroleum fiscal systems and Production Sharing contracts. 
Tulsa.Okla,PennWell, 1994. 
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7 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Different Regimes 
 
In general both Concession and PSC can achieve the desired objectives of the Federal 
Governments, such as appropriation of wealth and investments in the sector through the 
IOCs. There are however a few differences in how efficiently and in what way the 
different regimes obtain these objectives, and in this chapter we look at these 
differences in some more detail with a special focus on the Brazilian sub-Salt.  
 
7.1  Production Sharing Contract 
 The international experience of the PSC demonstrates both positive and negative 
aspects in its utilization. A positive aspect of the PSC regime is the way the HC is able 
to get its hand on the profit in a very efficient manner as it keeps a part of the 
production, the profit oil, and the share of the IOC is only transferred to the IOC at the 
wellhead. The Angolan model is a good example of this taken into consideration the 
way the rate of return (ROR) is used. However, before the HC can take its share, the 
IOC’s have the right to take a share of the oil produced, in order to recover the costs of 
its investment (costs of capital and operational expenses). This share is also taken from 
the oil exploited, i.e., the cost oil.  
 
The PSCs are self-contained, which means that they possess an autonomy and 
completeness so that an external regulatory organ is not neccessary. In general, the 
IOCs prefer this model in countries with low institutional maturity, because they feel 
more protected, given the risks of political instability, absence of transparency and legal 
vagueness of the HC. This is positive in countries with unorganized tribunal systems, 
such as Angola and Indonesia, but in more organized countries where the OCs feel 
more secure, such as Norway and Brazil, this cannot be taken as a positive 
characteristic of the PSC.  
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Considering the positive aspects of the PSC we can already at this stage point out some 
of the motivations that the Brazilian Government has for changing the regime. The 
main motivations are: firstly, to increase the Government take of the profit and maintain 
the attractiveness of investing in E&P; secondly, permit that the HC do investments in 
the exploitation and production phase and establish additional presence of the HC in the 
activity through a new public agent (Petro-Sal); thirdly, permit Governmental control of 
the phase of production and the destination of the petroleum; and finally, maintain the 
possibility of participation of Petrobras in the new blocks.  
 
One important negative aspect of PSC in the Sub-salt area in Brazil is the complexity 
involved with utilizing two systems in this area. As the Concession regime will remain 
in some of the blocks, applying the PSC in some or all of the new blocks will lead to 
two “parallel systems”. This requires two different regulatory frameworks that 
essencially are to obtain the same objectives, which may be a challenge. Another 
negative aspect is the difficulty with the harmonization necessary when different 
regulating models are combined.  
 
The PSC is also considered a system that is hard to inspect and control for the 
Government because it is in general hard to compute the cost oil and profit oil. It is thus 
challenging to calculate the profit and how this is divided between the different parts.   
 
7.2 Concession 
Regarding the Brazilian Sub-salt the Concession regime is first of all easier to 
implement than the PSC because it represents a mere continuation of the existing 
regime. Taking into consideration that the Concession system was a good system for 
Brazil, it is in many aspects easier to improve an already existing system and obtain 
good results in this way, than to implement a completely new system in order to obtain 
good results. A continuation of the Concession regime is also favourable because some 
parts of the Sub-salt areas will continue with this system, and keeping to one system 
will reduce complexity.  
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The Concession is also easier to inspect than the PSC, as it is easier to divide the profit 
between the HC and the IOC than it is to calculate the profit and cost oil. In addition the 
Concession regime is also fazilitated by the standardization of the contract used.  
 
Even though the Concession regime represents several advantages, there are also 
objectives that are not obtained through this system. It has for example turned out to be 
difficult to implement the principles of “local content” through the Concession regime. 
This has been an important objective for the Brazilian Government and also an 
important motivation for abandoning the Concession. The Government thus believes 
that the local content will work more efficiently in under the PSC. This is still an open 
question though, and there are no guarantees that changing to the PSC regime will 
improve this.  
 
From the Government’s point of view it is not favourable that the IOCs have complete 
control over the extracted petroleum. The Brazilian Government wishes to have more 
control over the petroleum in addition to take a greater cut of the profit. One way to do 
this, as the Government sees it, is to change to the PSC regime, under which they 
believe that they have more control. The fact that the HC is not directly involved with 
the production and only has a certain control over the technical aspects, has lead to a 
desire from the Government to create mechanisms that allows 
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8 Conclusion 
 
The discovery of the sub-salt field in Brazil led to a discussion on how to best utilize 
the natural resources. As the sub-salt field is larger and the oil is of better quality than 
the rest of Brazil the Government understood that an alteration of the regime was 
necessary in order to guarantee the Government take and at the same time remain an 
attractive country for foreign oil companies to invest in.  
 
There are two ways that the system can be altered: either through a mere continuation of 
the Concession regime with modified royalties and taxes, or by introducing a new 
system, such as the PSC. The Governement chose to keep the Concession in the already 
developed areas and to introduce the PSC in all new blocks in the sub-salt field.  
 
The alteration of the regime has led to much discussion, mainly because the Concession 
regime in Brazil was working well and it served to satisfy its main objectives. The 
Brazilian Concession system was highly regarded for its openness and transparency. 
The petroleum industry has also developed steadily under the Concession regime, 
which has also been taken as an argument for keeping this system. The predictability of 
the system has also made Brazil an attractive country for international companies to 
invest. Even though the PSCs are self-contained, and in this way represent more 
stability and predictability for the IOCs, the Concession regime in Brazil, due to 
Brazil’s institutional maturity and transparency in the sector, it is not likely that the PSC 
regime will improve how the IOCs regard Brazil as an investment opportunity.  
 
The quantity and quality of the sub-salt field has been used by the Government as an 
argument that exploring for oil in this area is a safe investment and that profit is more or 
less guaranteed, and because of this, there is a strong need to change the system in order 
to adapt to this new situation. The Government thus changed to the PSC regime in the 
remaining of this field in order to maximize the Government take. It is, however, a mis-
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conception that the Government take automatically increases by introducing the PSC. 
We have shown that it is possible to obtain the same economic benefits for the HC 
through the Concession and the PSC and that both regimes are likely to produce the 
same economical result. Comparing the two regimes from an economic persepective 
one arrives at similar Government takes regardless of what contract is in force. The 
argument that changing to a PSC regime will increase the Government take is thus not 
necessarily true as the same results can be obtained by increasing for example the 
special participation rate in the existing Concession regime.  
 
One advantage of keeping the existing regime is that this can be altered without the 
approval of the Parliament and alteration of the Constitution. Introducing the PSC will, 
however, require these alterations. This means that no sub-salt blocks will be made 
available for bidding until the Government has established a new regulatory framework 
for the sector. 
 
Another motivating factor for changing the regime is to increase the Governmental 
control in the sector. In this thesis we have shown that the Government can exercise a 
greater control over the oil companies under the PSC regime than under the Concession 
regime. Because the IOC acts as a service-provider for the HC under the PSC regime 
the Government has more direct control over the IOCs and the production. In addition 
by introducing Petro-sal the Government’s involvement in the industry will be more 
direct, something which is also guaranteed by the fact that Petrobras always has a share 
of at least 30% in the exploration. By changing to the PSC regime is thus likely that the 
Brazilian Government will have an increased direct control with the industry.  
 
Norway has one of the highest Governemt takes in the world and operates under a 
Concession regime. The oil reserves in Norway also have many of the same 
characteristics as the sub-salt fields in Brazil. It is obvious that it would be possible for 
Brazil to develop these fields under the Concession regime and obtain the same 
objectives by following the Norwegian model. It is thus probable that the alteration of 
the regime from Concession to PSC is not economically but politically motivated.  
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Altering the regime does not guarantee a greater percentage of the earnings to the HC, 
but it is politically appealing to leaders who want to show that they are in control of 
national resources. The political element has been a key part of Lula’s drive for PSCs, 
which is illustrated by repeatedly declearing that "Sub-salt is ours." The fact that the 
Government can exercise a greater control over the oil companies under the PSC than 
under the Concession regime also has a strong political appeal.  
 
As we have seen, when the strategic and economic importance of the activities involved 
with E&P of hydrocarbons in Brazil are considered, guaranteeing that a sufficient part 
of the produced hydrocarbons end up in the State’s hands is of vital importance. The 
fact that the petroleum is always the property of the Government under the PSC regime 
is also appealing for politicians who want to show that the oil is the property of the 
Brazilian people and not of the international oil companies.  
 
The widespread use of PSCs illustrates well their efficiency as an institutional 
arrangement for risk sharing, even if they are inefficient in terms of economic theory. 
The fact that they are not extremely effective in terms of economic theory and that other 
regimes can obtain the same results can also be taken as an argument that changing to 
the PSA regime is politically motivated rather than economically motivated. The way 
we see it, the alteration of the regime that has been proposed for the sub-salt field in 
Brazil will not result in much change when it comes to the economic and regulatory 
parts of the operation. It will, however, bring with it a more complex system because an 
alteration is required, as opposed a mere continuation of the existing regime, and it will 
also require two regimes to operate one alongside the other. From the IOCs point of 
view we do not see that this alteration will change how Brazil will be looked at as an 
investment opportunity. Nor will the alteration result in much change when it comes to 
the expected profits of the IOCs or the risks involved with operating in Brazil. The 
IOCs will probably see some change when it comes to Government participation and 
control. This is probably also one of the main motivations for altering the system 
alongside with the political message that President Lula wants to give to the Brazilian 
people a few months before the election of the new president.  
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